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Mr. Justice Black's Fourteenth Amendment
Wallace Mendelson*
I. INTRODUCTION
What the thirteenth amendment' promised, the Black Codes
effectively denied. This was the seed bed of the fourteenth
amendment. As though recognizing the futility of trying to item-
ize the evils to be enjoined, the amending fathers resorted to
generalities:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.2
Avoiding the strait jacket of precision, they risked ambiguity.
And so the fourteenth amendment stands as a trap to test the
skill of judges-a Gordian Knot against which a man reveals
much of his character and his conception of the judicial process.
After several false starts,3 Mr. Justice Black found in the
principle of "incorporation" an Alexandrian answer to the am-
biguities of the fourteenth amendment. As he put it in Adamson
v. California:
My study of the historical events that culminated in the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the expressions of those who sponsored
and favored, as well as those who opposed its submission and
passage, persuades me that one of the chief objects that the pro-
visions of the Amendment's first section, separately, and as a
whole, were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states. With full knowledge of the
import of the Barron decision, the framers and backers of the
Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed its purpose to be to over-
turn the constitutional rule that case had announced.4
While the Justice does not say it explicitly, the whole tenor
of his opinions in Adamson and Duncan,5 as well as the implica-
* Professor of Government, University of Texas
1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a pun-
ishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
2. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
3. See P. FREui), ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 30-33
(1949).
4. 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947). As to other "objects" of the four-
teenth amendment, see id. at 72 n.5. Cf. note 60 infra, and accompany-
ing text.
5. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968).
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tion of his Griswold6 holding, make clear his view that the
Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection
Clauses mean no more and no less with respect to the states
than the Bill of Rights means vis-A-vis the national govern-
ment.7 Thus the imprecision of the fourteenth amendment's
first section would be cured by the "clearly marked ... bound-
aries,"" the "specific,"9 and "particular standards enumerated"'1
in the Bill of Rights. To the extent, of course, that the Bill of
Rights provides fixed meanings, incorporation would rob the
Civil War Amendment of its flexible, or viable-what the Justice
calls its "natural law""--quality. Small wonder, then, if Jus-
tice Black himself should find such strait jacketing unaccept-
able in practice.
In a classic article, Charles Fairman concluded that the evi-
dence in support of "incorporation" is negligible.' 2 As Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan put it in Duncan:
The overwhelming historical evidence marshalled by Professor
Fairman demonstrates, to me conclusively, that the Congress-
men and state legislators who wrote, debated, and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment did not think they were "incorporating"
the Bill of Rights and the very breadth and generality of the
Amendment's provisions suggest that its authors did not
suppose that the Nation would always be limited to mid-19th
century conceptions of "liberty" and "due process of law" but
that the increasing experience and evolving conscience of the
American people would add new [meanings]. 13
Now, some 19 years after the Fairman attack, Mr. Justice
Black responds:
I have read and studied this article extensively, including the
historical references, but am compelled to add that in my view
it has completely failed to refute the inferences and arguments
that I suggested in my Adamson dissent. Professor Fairman's
"History" relies very heavily on what was not said in the state
legislatures that passed on the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead
of relying on this kind of negative pregnant, my legislative
experience has convinced me that it is far wiser to rely on what
was said, and most importantly, by the men who actually
sponsored the Amendment in the Congress. I know from my
years in the United States Senate that it is to men like Congress-
6. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965).
7. The separate dissent of Justices Murphy and Rutledge in
Adamson indicates this was their understanding of their Brother Black's
position.
8. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 525 (1965).
9. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 45, 82 (1947).
10. Id. at 91.
11. Id.
12. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill
of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
13. 391 U.S. 145, 174-75 (1968).
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man Bingham, who steered the Amendment through the House,
and Senator Howard, who introduced it in the Senate, that
members of Congress look when they seek the real meaning of
what is being offered.14
If, as charged, Professor Fairman's criticism relies too heavily
on "negative" evidence, let us examine Mr. Justice Black's pos-
itive data in support of his "separately, and as a whole," no-more-
no-less incorporation theory.
II. JUSTICE BLACK AND THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. SENATOR HOWARD
In a 31-page appendix to his Adamson opinion, the Justice
presents the heart of the historical "evidence" in support of his
position. Referring to this material in Duncan, he draws from
it a May 23, 1866, speech by Senator Howard. Singled out in this
manner, the speech-introducing the proposed amendment in the
Senate-must be deemed a major bastion of Mr. Justice Black's
position. Here is the quotation exactly as the Justice presents it:
Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken
of in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution
[the Senator had just read from the old opinion of Corfield v.
Corell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (E.D. Pa. 1825)]. To these
privileges and immunities, whatever they may be-for they are
not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and pre-
cise nature-to these should be added the personal rights guar-
antied and secured by the first eight amendments of the Con-
stitution; such as the freedom of speech and of the press; the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances, a right appertaining to each
and all the people; the right to keep and to bear arms; the right
to be exempted from the quartering of soldiers in a house with-
out the consent of the owner; the right to be exempt from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and from any search or seiz-
ure by virtue of a warrant issued upon a formal oath or affi-
davit; the right of an accused person to be informed of the
nature of the accusation against him, and his right to be tried by
an impartial jury of the vicinage; and also the right to be secure
against excessive bail and against cruel and unusual punish-
ments.
Now, sir, here is a mass of privileges, immunities and
rights, some of them secured by the second section of the fourth
article of the Constitution, which I have recited, some by the
first eight amendments of the Constitution; and it is a fact well
worthy of attention that the course of decision of our courts
and the present settled doctrine is, that all these immunities,
privileges, rights, thus- guarantied by the Constitution or recog-
nized by it, are secured to the citizens solely as a citizen of the
United States and as a party in their courts. They do not
operate in the slightest degree as a restraint or prohibition upon




*.. The great object of the first section of this amendment is,
therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel them
at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees.15
What the Senator here says inter alia is that the object of
the first section of the proposed fourteenth amendment is to im-
pose upon the states the "guarantees" of (a) the old "privileges
and immunities" clause 16 and (b) the first eight amendments.
This is not Mr. Justice Black's positf'on at all. He insists that the
fourteenth amendment picks up only the first eight amendments
-the Bill of Rights. The difficulty here is far more than bald
discrepancy. For what Howard sought to incorporate includes
one of the most ambiguous provisions of the Constitution-the
old privileges and immunities guarantees which Howard says
"are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and
precise nature." Surely then Mr. Justice Black cannot rely upon
the Senator for the proposition that the vagueness of the four-
teenth amendment is cured by incorporation of the "clearly
marked ... boundaries," the "specific" and "particular stand-
ards enumerated" in the Bill of Rights.
This, however, is only the beginning of the difficulty in Mr.
Justice Black's position. Examination of Howard's entire speech
indicates that, in the portion quoted by the Justice, the Senator
was defining only the meaning of the proposed new Privileges
and Immunities Clause.1 7 Thus, in Senator Howard's view, the
new Privileges and Immunities Clause and it alone would in-
corporate the Bill of Rights and the old Privileges and Im-
munities Clause. But this new clause covers only citizens. That
means, as Howard carefully emphasized a few paragraphs prior
to the material quoted by Mr. JusLice Black, the incorporated
protections would apply only to citizens of the United States.
Aliens and corporations would still be denied all benefit of the
incorporated Bill of Rights. This is emphasized when later in
the same speech Senator Howard defined the two remaining
generalities of the fourteenth amendment's first section:
The last two clauses of the first section . . . disable a State
from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any
person, whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law, or from denying to him the equal pro-
tection of the laws of the State. This abolishes all class legis-
15. Id. at 166-67.
16. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2.
17. A few sentences later Senator Howard defined the meaning of
its companion Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See note 18
infra, and accompanying text.
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lation in the States and does away with the injustice of sub-
jecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to
another.18
Plainly Senator Howard distinguished between the people as
well as the interests covered by the new Privileges and Im-
munities Clause and those covered by the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses.
These distinctions were in part the basis of the pointed ques-
tions Mr. Justice Frankfurter had directed to his Brother Black
in Bridges v. California:
To say that the protection of freedom of speech of the First
Amendment is absorbed by the Fourteenth does not say enough.
Which one of the various limitations upon state power intro-
duced by the Fourteenth Amendment absorbs the First? Some
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only to citi-
zens, and one of the petitioners here is an alien; some of its
provisions apply only to natural persons, and another petitioner
here is a corporation .... Only the Due Process Clause
assures constitutional protection of civil liberties to aliens and
corporations. Corporations cannot claim for themselves the
"liberty" which the Due Process Clause guarantees. That clause
protects only their property. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535. [Mr. Justice Black] is strangely silent in failing
to avow the specific constitutional provision upon which [his]
decision rests.19
Years later the response came in a revealing evasion: The
various provisions in question "separately, and as a whole" em-
brace the Bill of Rights.2 0  In effect, Mr. Justice Black homog-
enized provisions, the meaning of which, his guide, Senator
Howard, had treated as separate and distinct. To change the
figure, the Justice treats the terms of the different clauses as in-
terchangeable. Borrowing the privileges and immunities lan-
guage as a reference to the Bill of Rights from one,2 1 and the
word "persons" to get the desired breadth of coverage from an-
other, he creates a new constitutional provision! Thus we "es-
cape" Senator Howard's explanation that only citizens would be
protected by the incorporated Bill of Rights. Of course, the Sena-
tor's limitation would be unacceptable to one as concerned as
Mr. Justice Black with, for example, freedom of the press since
most newspapers are published by corporations.
22
If, as the Justice holds, one should look to Senator Howard
18. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
19. 314 U.S. 252, 280-81 (1941).
20. See note 4 supra, and accompanying text.
21. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1968).
22. See Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 99, 98 P.2d
983 (1940), alf'd sub nom. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
1969]
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to get "the real meaning" of the fourteenth amendment, one
would have to reject the doctrine that the provisions of the first
section of the fourteenth amendment "separately, and as a
whole" incorporated the Bill of Rights and no more. For it does
not appear that the Senator ever in any relevant way altered
the views he expressed when introducing the fourteenth amend-
ment in the United States Senate.
B. CONGRESSMAm BINGRA
What, then of Mr. Justice Black's other major witness-
Congressman Bingham-whom the Justice calls the James Mad-
ison of the fourteenth amendment? 23 The implied comparison
seems a slur upon the sharp-minded Father of the Constitution.
For Bingham is one who used ringing rhetoric as a substitute for
rational analysis. It is he whom Mr. Justice Harlan refers to as
one who "effectively demonstrated (a) that he did not under-
stand Barron v. Baltimore ... and therefore did not understand
the question of incorporation, and (b) that he was not himself
understood by his colleagues. '24
In February of 1866-prior to the Howard speech quoted
above-Bingham introduced in the House this early version of
the fourteenth amendment:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,
and to all persons in the several states equal protection in the
rights of life, liberty, and property.25
Explaining these provisions, Bingham said:
[This] proposed amendment does not impose upon any state of
the Union, or any citizen of any State of the Union, any obli-
gation which is not now enjoined upoon them by the very letter
of the Constitution [via the Supremacy Clause, art. VI.J. 26
In Bingham's view, the Bill of Rights was already binding upon
the states. Though he mouthed its crucial language, he appar-
ently either did not understand the Barron case--or found it
qualified by Daniel Webster.2 The purpose of the proposed
23. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 73-74 (1947).
24. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 175 n.9 (1968).
25. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
26. Id.
27. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833). Per
Chief Justice Marshall: "These [first eight] amendments contain no
expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state govern-
ments. This court cannot so apply them." As to Bingham's reliance on
Webster, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866).
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fourteenth amendment, Bingham explained, was simply to make
the Bill of Rights enforceable. For as everyone knew, the
officials of eleven states "in utter disregard of these injunctions
of your Constitution, in utter disregard of that official oath
which the Constitution required [of them], have violated in
every sense of the word these provisions of the Constitution.
. . ,"28 Thus, as Bingham saw it, the purpose of the proposed
fourteenth amendment was not to incorporate anything, but to
give Congress power to enforce prohibitions already in the Con-
stitution. In his view, the only totally new aspect of the proposed
amendment was to be found in its opening words: "The Con-
gress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to [enforce existing constitutional provisions]." If
the goal was to place constitutional prohibitions upon the states,
where are the prohibitory words? Surely under the proposal of
February, 1866, the states would be as free as ever until Con-
gress-acting within its new authority-should rule otherwise,
and later Congress, by repeal, could certainly restore the status
quo ante.
The February, 1866, version of the amendment underwent
many changes.2 9 Bingham's basic ideas did not. Continuing to
misunderstand Barron, and ignoring the added prohibitory lan-
guage, he said in his May 10, 1866, final summation:
. . . there remains a want now, in the Constitution of our coun-
try, which the proposed amendment will supply. What is it?
It is the power in the people . .. to do that by Congressional
enactment which hitherto they have not had the power to do
. . . that is to protect by national law the privileges and im-
munities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights
of every person . . .whenever the same shall be abridged or
denied by the [already] unconstitutional acts of any State.
Allow me ... in passing, to say that this amendment takes
from no State any right that ever pertained to it. No State ever
had the right, under the forms of law or otherwise, to deny to
any freeman the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the
privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic, al-
though many of them have assumed and exercised the
power .... SO
28. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
29. It is worth noting that much-perhaps most-of the pre-enact-
ment discussion quoted in the Adamson appendix relates to the February,
1866, draft of the fourteenth amendment-the draft that imposed no
constitutional restraints upon the states! In this writer's view, the
appendix is misleading because it does not clearly distinguish between
Bingham's problem of "securing" enforcement, and Mr. Justice Black's
problem of "securing" incorporation.
30. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866). By this time
Bingham's "Congress shall have.., power" approach had been replaced
1969]
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In the debates on the proposed amendment, Bingham re-
ferred more than once to a "bill of rights" which he wanted
Congress to have power to enforce.31 Yet never then did he
equate it with the first eight amendments. He seems to have
had a unique conception of what the Bill of Rights was. For
example, in his introductory address, after discussing the fifth
amendment Due Process Clause and the article IV Privileges
and Immunities Clause, he referred to them as "these great pro-
visions of the Constitution, this immortal bill of rights. 13 2 This
usage does not seem to be an inadvertent slip of the tongue since
it recurs in at least two more instances.
33
The entire House discussion just mentioned-and penultimate
adoption of the proposed fourteenth amendment-occurred prior
to Senator Howard's speech on incorporation. Thereafter the
measure went back to the House for adoption of the Senate's
changes.3 4 This was accomplished in a few hours on July 13, 1866,
without reference to the Bill of Rights or Senator Howard's in-
corporation talk. The House seems never to have discussed or
considered any version or hint of incorporation.
For all that appears in Mr. Justice Black's Appendix, Bing-
in section 1 with "No State shall make or enforce any law.. . ." The
latter, completely reorienting section 1, apparently was first suggested
by Congressman Hotchkiss. Id. at 1095.
It is noteworthy that Bingham's final discussion still centered on the
grant of power to Congress-now appearing in section 5-as though the
"Hotchkiss restriction" upon state authority was unimportant. Surely if
in his view incorporation was a major purpose of the proposed four-
teenth amendment, he would have referred to the restrictive language
that did the incorporating. If he had ever contemplated new constitu-
tional prohibitions upon the states, why did he never say so; why did he
constantly talk about the need for congressional power to legislate
against state misconduct?
31. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866).
32. Id. at 1034.
33. Id. at 1089-91. At one point Bingham did use language that
could be read as equating the Bill of Rights with one or more of the
early amendments: "A gentleman . . . wanted to know if I could cite
a decision showing that the power of the federal government to enforce
... the bill of rights under the articles of amendment to the Constitu-
tion had been denied." Id. at 1089. Here, of course, he was paraphras-
ing the language of another, namely, Congressman Hale, who had clearly
referred to the first ten amendments as the Bill of Rights. But Hale had
concentrated on and confined the discussion specifically to the fifth
amendment, resisting Bingham's attempt to work into the discussion
the article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause as a part of the Bill of
Rights. Id. at 1064. For all that appears, Bingham's language just
quoted may have been merely a reference to the fifth amendment which
along with article IV, clause 2 seemed to be his "bill of rights."
34. The only change relevant here was the addition of the citizen-
ship clause at the beginning of section 1.
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ham did not until after the fourteenth amendment had been
ratified expressly equate the first eight amendments with the
Bill of Rights, or speak of the new amendment as incorporating
it. But even then he adopted Senator Howard's view that
it was the new Privileges and Immunities Clause rather than the
entire section which brought about this result:
Mr. Speaker, that the scope and meaning of the limitations
imposed by the first section, fourteenth amendment... may be
more fully understood, permit me to say that the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States ... are chiefly de-
fined in the first eight amendments....
Is it not clear that other and different privileges and im-
munities than those to which a citizen of a State was entitled
are secured by the provision of the fourteenth article, that no
State shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States, which are defined in the eight articles of
amendment... ?5
If, as Mr. Justice Black holds, legislators look to the sponsors
of a measure to find its "real meaning," plainly the two houses
did not adopt the same fourteenth amendment. The Senate
sponsor said one of its clauses incorporated something, although
this something was rather different from that described by
Mr. Justice Black. The House sponsor thought it incorporated
nothing-there being no need to reincorporate what was already
in the Constitution. He, of course, later changed his mind, but
too late to influence anyone's vote. Moreover, it is far from
clear that even then he agreed with the Senate leader as to
precisely what was incorporated.
We are asked in effect to believe that Senator Howard's lone
reference to some type of incorporation made another type so
widely understood, so universally accepted as to be taken for
granted, without discussion, in the House, in the Senate, and in
the state ratifying bodies. Only on such a premise can one dis-
miss Professor Fairman's evidence of what was "not said."
C. TIE OPPOSITION
Mr. Justice Black says legislators "vote for or against a bill
based [not only] on what [its sponsors say it means but also on
what] those who opposed it tell them it means."3 6 There was,
of course, substantial congressional opposition to the proposed
fourteenth amendment. Nowhere in Duncan does Mr. Justice
Black direct us to the opposition arguments he has in mind.
35. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 84 (1871).
36. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 165 (1968).
1969]
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His Adamson Appendix says merely:
Opposition speakers emphasized that the Amendment would
destroy state's rights and empower Congress to legislate on
matters of purely local concern. [citations omitted]. Some
took the position that the Amendment was unnecessary because
the Bill of Rights were [sic] already secured against state
legislation. [Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Sess.] 1059, 1066,
1088.37
The Justice's use of the word "secured" is confusing. Does he
mean some congressmen thought the proposed fourteenth
amendment was surplusage because it embraced Bill of Rights
provisions already applicable to the states? If that were an
opposition argument, it would support the incorporation theory.
One finds in the Justice's page references no evidence that
any Congressman took that position. No doubt some-includ-
ing Bingham, as we have seen-thought the "Bill of Rights"
was "already secured against State violation," in the sense that
it was already binding upon the states. But Bingham's prime
concern was that the "Bill of Rights" be "secured against State
violation" in a different sense, i.e., by giving Congress an enforc-
ing power.
Congressman Hale of New York seems the most articulate
opponent of this aspect of Bingham's measure. His objection
was not that the fourteenth amendment was surplusage. He
addressed rather the congressional enforcement problem. In his
view the proposed language was "extremely vague, loose, and
indefinite. '38 The grant of power to Congress was, in effect,
"... a provision under which all State legislation ... affecting
the individual citizen, may be overridden, may be repealed or
abolished, and the law of Congress established instead."39 But,
Hale continued, even if the grant to Congress related only to
state laws which fail to give "equal protection to all persons
... in the rights of life, liberty, and property" as Bingham and
Stevens argued, it would still go too far:
Take the case of the rights of married women; did anyone ever
assume that Congress was to be invested with the power to
legislate on that subject, and to say that married women, in
regard to their rights of property, should stand on the same
footing with men and unmarried women? There is not a State
in the Union where disability of married women in relation to
the rights of property does not to a greater or less extent still
exist.40
Hale noted in passing that he thought the Bill of Rights was
37. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 95 (1947).
38. Coxa. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866).
39. Id. at 1063.
40. Id. at 1064.
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judicially enforceable against the states.41 Bingham answered
that the Bill of Rights, while binding upon the states, 42 was not
enforceable against them.43 It followed, for him, that Congress
must be armed with power to enforce the Bill of Rights. 44 Thus,
the crux of Hale's opposition was the scope of that power, its
effect upon the federal system, and nothing more.
It comes at last to this: Just as no one supported the
"separately, and as a whole," no-more-no-less, incorporation
doctrine, no one opposed it. The Black amendment simply was
not before Congress!
III. JUSTICE BLACK AND JUDICIAL HISTORY
Twitchell v. Pennsylvania45 was decided only a few months
after the fourteenth amendment had become law-the Court
reaffirming and following Barron. Neither counsel nor any
member of the Court seemed aware of "incorporation," though it
might have saved a man's life.
Writing in 1963, Mr. Justice Douglas observed that "ten
Justices have felt [the fourteenth amendment] protects from
infringement by the States the privileges, protections, and safe-
guards granted by the Bill of Rights. '46 The Justice recognized,
however, that of his six pre-Black judges one ultimately "re-
treated;" there is some doubt about the beliefs of a second; and
three others-as well as the justice who retreated-thought only
citizens benefited from incorporation.47 What Mr. Justice Doug-
las says, then, comes to this: Of the 43 Justices in the era after
adoption of the fourteenth amendment until Mr. Justice Black's
appointment, only one unequivocally felt that all persons were
protected by an incorporated Bill of Rights.
48
Except for Justices Black and Douglas, no Supreme Court
judge has ever supported the "separately, and as a whole," no-
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1090.
43. Id. at 1089-90.
44. Id. at 1090. It should be noted that it is unclear whether
Bingham was referring to his version of the Bill of Rights. See notes
23-33 supra, and accompanying text.
45. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869).
46. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1963).
47. Three of these six judges were on the Twitchell Court. For
them the light seems to have come late.
48. Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's observation in Adamson v. Cal-
ifornia, 332 U.S. 46, 59, 62 (1947). Justices Douglas and Frankfurter
disagree only on the views of Mr. Justice Clifford, about whom Mr.
Justice Douglas plainly and necessarily has doubts.
1969]
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more-no-less, version of incorporation. Moreover, while Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas once did so, 49 he has since changed his mind:
"Though I believe that 'due process' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment includes all of the first eight Amendments, I do not
think it is restricted and confined to them."50 Thus, except for
the temporary support of one colleague, Mr. Justice Black's view
is as unique in Supreme Court history as it was unknown in the
39th Congress.
Does the Court's lone advocate of the Black amendment
find it in fact compelling? What in the "clearly marked ...
boundaries," the "specific" and "particular standards enumer-
ated" in the incorporated Bill of Rights requires a ban on vague
criminal statutes,r' the appointment of counsel 2 or the outlaw-
ing of geographic representation?
53
It was only a few months after his Adamson dissent that Mr.
Justice Black with the Court in Winters v. New York 4 found
vague criminal statutes to be proscribed by the fourteenth
amendment. Though the Court relied on the Due Process Clause,
such traditional handling of the problem is not now available to
Mr. Justice Black. Drawing his Adamson strait jacket tighter
and tighter, he insists "due process" is merely a ban on ex post
facto laws:
The phrase "due process of law" has through the years evolved
as the successor in purpose and meaning to the words "law of
the land" in Magna Charta which more plainly intended to call
for a trial according to the existing law of the land in effect at
the time an alleged offense had been committed. Nothing done
since Magna Charta can be pointed to as intimating that the
Due Process Clause gives courts power to fashion laws in order
to meet new conditions, to fit the "decencies" of changed con-
ditions, or to keep their consciences from being shocked by
legislation, state or federal.55
Gideon presents other difficulties. 56 Literally, the sixth
amendment, whether or not incorporated, requires not that one
49. He alone joined in his Brother Black's dissent in Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947).
50. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516 (1961). Thus Mr. Justice
Douglas shifted post hoc from the Black to the Murphy-Rutledge posi-
tion in Adamson. This spared him Mr. Justice Black's difficulties dis-
cussed in the next paragraphs of this article.
51. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
52. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
53. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575-76 (1964).
54. 333 U.S. 507 (1948). See also Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S.
199 (1960); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
55. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 59, 62 (1967). See also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965).
56. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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shall have counsel, but merely the right to counsel-just as the
Constitution guarantees not that one shall have a railroad ticket,
but merely the right to travel to the seat of government." Surely
the counsel provision was included in the Bill of Rights merely to
kill the common law ban on representation by counsel in non-
treason criminal cases. s As a matter of language and history,
then, the sixth amendment means simply that the accused shall
be free to hire legal assistance. Surely appeal to the Bill of Rights
to clarify and stabilize the fourteenth amendment is an empty
gesture unless one respects its "clearly marked ... boundaries."
Since Gideon, however, the Justice has found means of curing
that difficulty. In Gilbert v. California9 he quotes from the sixth
amendment as follows: ".... the accused shall... have the As-
sistance of Counsel for his defense." Thus the troublesome words
"right to" disappear. But surely the word "have," which remains,
cannot be separated from the omitted words without distorting
both grammar and meaning. In short, "to have" is not the equiv-
alent of "right to have." His Adamson strait jacket prevents the
Justice from reaching simply and candidly6" a result that seems
to have virtually unanimous professional approval and little or
no popular opposition.
Mr. Justice Black insists the amending of the Constitution
must be left to Congress and the people in accordance with
article V.01 He presents himself as a "literalist,"62 lest "natural
law" creep into the Constitution by means of judicial legisla-
tion. 3 Yet neither the fourteenth amendment nor the Bill of
Rights literally bans geographic representation in legislatures.
Moreover, considering the contexts and the debates which pro-
duced them, neither was intended or expected to do so. How can
they achieve in combination what neither does separately? If
the Bill of Rights does not forbid geographic representation, how
can the fourteenth amendment be deemed to do so, since, as we
are told, it merely incorporates the Bill of Rights?64
57. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
58. See W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO CounsEL nz AixamcA COURTS
8-44 (1955).
59. 388 U.S. 263, 279 (1967).
60. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The Art of Overruling, 1963
Sup. CT. REV. 211.
61. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-78 (1966);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965).
62. See Calm, Mr. Justice Black and First Amendment Absolutes:
A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 549, 555 (1962).
63. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520-26 (1965).
64. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575-76 (1964).
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Finally, how can the incorporated Bill of Rights preclude
"separate but equal" when the Bill of Rights itself lived side by
side with and protected slavery for generations? 5 Indeed, when
the Court finally outlawed race segregation in the District of
Columbia, it did so by "incorporating" into the Bill of Rights the
fourteenth amendment Equal Protection Clause rather than vice
versa.66
It comes, does it not, to this: the first eight amendments,
incorporated or not, are as wordless on vague statutes, appointed
counsel, geographic representation, and racial segregation as Mr.
Justice Black finds them to be on contraceptives and a general
right to privacy?67 Surely it is only what the Justice deprecates
as "natural law" that proscribes such things.
IV. PROFESSOR CROSSKEY ON INCORPORATION
With some kind words for Mr. Justice Black, Professor Cross-
key in 1954 launched a counterattack upon Professor Fairman's
anti-incorporationism.6 8 The Justice does not allude to Professor
Crosskey in his Duncan opinion, and the reason seems clear.
Crosskey opens his article with this strange assertion:
In Adamson v. California . . . Justice Hugo. L. Black expressed
the view that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment ought to be taken as making the first
eight Amendments... good against the states.69
Crosskey then undertakes to prove that the 1868 Privileges and
Immunities Clause alone was indeed designed to incorporate the
Bill of Rights inter aZia. But this, of course, was not and is not Mr.
Justice Black's position at all. As -the Justice sees it, "the pro-
visions of the amendment's first section, separately, and as a
whole" incorporate the Bill of Rights. 7 0 If Crosskey proves his
own case-incorporation via the Privileges and Immunities
Clause-he thereby necessarily disproves Mr. Justice Black's.
A crucial difference between these two versions of history
65. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
66. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 -(1954). Initially Mr. Justice
Black did not seem to recognize abolition of race discrimination or segre-
gation as one of the "objects" of the fourteenth amendment. See Adam-
son v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 72 n.5 (1947).
67. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965).
68. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and The Con-
stitutional Limitations On State Authority, 22 U. CHr. L. REv. 1 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Crosskey]. For Fairman's rebuttal, see A Reply
to Professor Crosskey, id. at 144.
69. Crosskey at 1.
70. (Emphasis added). See note 4 supra, and accompanying text.
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is that one would protect only citizens; the other would protect
both citizens and persons, including corporations. 71 But even
this discrepancy is not the end of the matter. The heart of
Crosskey's position is that Bingham and Howard held
certain constitutional views that are apt to seem remarkable
to most lawyers today; views that ran counter to certain earlier
decisions the Supreme Court had made, or counter to views
that have since come to be unquestioningly accepted. These
views, however, Howard and Bingham did not hold alone. For
the views in question were the common faith of the [Repub-
lican] party to which they belonged. .... 72
One element of this "common faith" was that the article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause meant, in 1866-68, not what
it means now but that "[t]he citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States in the several states."7 3 In short, the clause recognized
or created a national citizenship and protected the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States which "were
those conferred, in specific terms, by other provisions of the Con-
stitution and its various amendments.174 Thus, Crosskey's
position entails a double incorporation: in the beginning was
the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause; it acquired ad-
ditional meaning by incorporating the Bill of Rights; later still it
in turn was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment.
If we accept this remarkable position-apparently Mr. Jus-
tice Black could not-it would mean that Bingham simply
wanted Congress to have power to enforce certain "specific"
constitutional provisions, including the Bill of Rights. For, it
will be recalled, Bingham was concerned with enforcement, not
with reincorporating what he believed to be already binding
upon the states. Even if we assume Bingham wanted to incor-
porate something, Crosskey's view would put him in the position
of wanting to incorporate more than the Bill of Rights. After all,
the original Privileges and Immunities Clause preceded the Bill
of Rights by some two years. It must have initially had some
independent meaning. Thus, at best Crosskey here too contra-
dicts Mr. Justice Black, who insists the fourteenth amendment
incorporates only the Bill of Rights.
If the "common faith" of the Republican Party fixed the
meaning of "privileges and immunities" for Bingham and others,
it certainly did not do so for Howard. We saw that when the
71. See text accompanying note 18, supra.
72. Crosskey at 11.
73. Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
74. Id. at 13.
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Senator introduced the proposed fourteenth amendment, he said,
"these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be ... are
not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and pre-
cise nature .... ,,75 There is no record of anyone rising to clarify
the matter by reminding him of a widely held Republican faith.
In short, while Howard contemplated incorporation of the Bill
of Rights, he also contemplated incorporation of something else-
something that he found indefinable. Mr. Justice Black would
perhaps call it natural law, and reject the reading of such
"mush17 6 into the written Constitution.
Senator Howard's contemporaries on the Supreme Court
seem to have shared his unawareness. In the first case arising
under the fourteenth amendment, they examined the Privileges
and Immunities Clauses at some length and seemed completely
unmindful of Crosskey's special lexicography and the alleged
Republican "common faith."77
V. DEJA VII
Early fourteenth amendment issues came before a Supreme
Court composed of men who had witnessed the Civil War and
the resulting constitutional revisions. That Court's understand-
ing of the new amendments is significant:
... [N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading
purpose found in [all three Civil War amendments], lying at the
foundation of each, and without which none of them would
have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave
race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and
the protection of the newly-made freeman .... 78
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Field took a more spa-
cious view. The fourteenth amendment, he said, had been
adopted to give legal effect to the "declaration of 1776 of inalien-
able rights." As he put it more fully in a later case:
Among these ... rights, as proclaimed in that great document,
is the right of men to pursue their happiness, by which is
meant the right to pursue any lawful business or vocation, in
any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of
others. .... 79
75. See note 15 supra, and accompanying text.
76. The word is Mr. Justice Black's. See Cahn, supra note 62, at 562.
77. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
78. Id. at 71. See also the "strange" views of Roscoe Conkling-
one of Bingham's colleagues and twice almost a Justice-on the inten-
tions of the 39th Congress. Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938).




Thus, in Mr. Justice Field's view, the fourteenth amendment
incorporated the Declaration of Independence, which in turn
embraced laissez-faire as indispensable to the pursuit of happi-
ness. The Justice's intellectual successors eventually carried the
day, overplayed their hand, and-in due course--lost everything.
It was against this background that T. R. Powell in his final
summation observed:
I think that what I most object to in many Justices is something
that springs from a feeling of judicial duty to try to make out
that their conclusions came from the [plain meaning of the
written] Constitution.8 0
80. T. PowELL, VAGARiES Am VnmETrEs nv CONS uTI ONAL INTER-
PRETATION 179 (1956).
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